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Race and the War on Drugs
John P. Walterst
Michael Tonry accuses those of us who formed and implemented the anti-drug policies of the Bush Administration of racism. He says that we intentionally crafted government policy so
that large numbers of young black males would be arrested, and
that we did this for partisan political gain. In order to contrive
this calumny, Tonry misrepresents the drug problem, what was
known about it in 1989 (when the first National Drug Control
Strategy was crafted), the policies of the Bush Administration,
and the actual relationship between race, drug use, and drug
trafficking. Tonry's ridiculous accusations and breathless rhetoric
do not deserve to be treated seriously.1 What I propose to do for
t President of The New Citizenship Project, an organization created to advance a
renewal of American institutions and greater citizen control over national politics. Former
Acting Director and Deputy Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control
Policy ("ONDCP") for the Bush administration. I gratefully acknowledge the generous
support of the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, and
the Hudson Institute, which made possible much of the analysis from which this paper
draws.
' See Michael Tonry, Race and the War on Drugs, 1994 U Chi Legal F 25. It is telling that Tonry cites only a single policy document of the Bush administration. He also
fails to mention that federal drug enforcement was expanded and criminal penalties made
harsher before the Bush administration and Drug Czardom began. The key "toughness"
legislation was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 ("Act"), which passed with overwhelming
bipartisan support. John J. DiIulio, Jr., Cracking Down, 53 New Republic 53 (May 10,
1993). See also National Drug Control Program, 21 USC §§ 1501-1509 (1988). As DiIulio
has pointed out, "The 'Clinton-Gore Crime and Drug Plan' issued from Little Rock during
the campaign highlighted the bill as one of Senator Gore's great achievements." DiIulio,
New Republic at 53.
The only empirical evidence Tonry offers in support of his charge of racism is a
hodgepodge of data on prison populations and race. He mixes federal and state data without explanation and, more to the point, he mixes data on drug offenders by race with
broader categories of offenders by race. Tonry claims the drug war filled the jails and
prisons with black drug offenders, but that is simply untrue. See Tonry, 1994 U Chi Legal
F at 27. Drug offenders are a majority (roughly 56 percent) of the federal prison population of 71,608, but they are a much smaller share of the state and local incarcerated populations of 152,000. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics-1991 table 6.07 at 657, table 6.57 at 627, table 6.81 at 647 (1992).
Moreover, the racial disparity in the federal prison population-that is, the higher
percentage of blacks among the population of prison inmates than the percentage of
blacks in the general population-is less pronounced than it is in state and local prisons
and jails. Id. In 1991, the federal prison population was 66 percent white and 32 percent
black; roughly equal portions of both racial groups are identified as drug offenders-57
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the purposes of this volume, and in light of the presentations at
the symposium upon which it is based, is to offer a straightforward review of the drug problem as it existed in 1989, what we
did to address it, and what happened, concluding with a review
of the apparent demographic trends in cocaine use and cocaine

addiction.
I. THE DRUG PROBLEM IN 1989
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (the "Act") created the
Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP") within the
Executive Office of the President. The Act also directed the head
of the new office, the Director of National Drug Control Policy
(the "Director")-popularly referred to as the "Drug Czar"-to
prepare the first National Drug Control Strategy for submission

to Congress, by the President, within 180 days of the confirmation and swearing-in of the Director. Thereafter, the Act required
the Director to draft a new National Drug Control Strategy at
the beginning of each year to coincide roughly with the release of
the President's budget.2
percent of white males, 54 percent of black males. Id tables 6.95, 6.97 at 657. Over 92
percent of the federal prison population is male. Id table 6.95 at 657.
Less than 6 percent of the nation's incarcerated population resides in federal
prisons, however. The vast majority of the incarcerated remain in state prisons (711,643
in 1991, of which 35 percent are white and 46 percent are black) and in local jails
(426,479 in 1991, of which 41 percent are white and 43 percent are black). Bureau of Justice Statistics, CorrectionalPopulations in the United States, 1991 table 4.1 at 26 (1991)
(listing the characteristics of state prison inmates by race); id table 2.3 at 9 (listing the
demographic characteristics of jail inmates by race).
According to the latest available data for 1989, only 22 percent of the male jail population had a drug offense as their most serious offense: 24 percent had violent crime, 30
percent had property offenses, and 23 percent had public order offenses. Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1992 table 6.39 at 597 (1993). In
1991, however, only 21 percent of all state prison inmates had a drug offense as their
most serious offense, and only 25 percent of black state prison inmates had a drug offense
as their most serious offense: 47 percent had violent crime, 25 percent had property offenses, and 7 percent had public-order offenses. Id table 6.70 at 623. Blacks form a plurality of the state prison population; the plurality, however, is much more the result of convictions for violent crime than for drug offenses.
Since Tonry suggests that the disproportionate incarceration of blacks is simply racist, it is also worth noting that not only are blacks much more likely to be victims of violent crime than whites, but the offenders in the vast majority of those cases are also
black. In those 1991 cases in which the victims of completed violent crime were black, in
over 92 percent of the cases involving a lone offender, and in over 80 percent of the cases
involving multiple offenders, the offenders were also black. Id table 3.52 at 288, table 3.57
at 291.
2 The Act contains a variety of other requirements regarding the preparation,
content, and submission of the National Drug Control Strategy ("Strategy"), but these requirements are not pertinent here. See National Drug Control Program, 21 USC §§ 1501-
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One of the Drug Czar's first tasks was to determine the dimension and nature of the drug problem. As with most complex
social problems, the available information was limited, and some
of it was subject to conflicting interpretation. The illegal, covert
behavior at the heart of the drug problem made measurement of
the problems particularly difficult. This is not the place, however,
for an extended discussion of the technical issues involved in
assessing the drug problem. In short, despite some improvements
over the past five years, flaws exist in all the individual measures of the drug problem. Nonetheless, these measures contain
significant information, and no alternative sources of guidance
exist.
In January 1989, what made the drug problem a crisis was
cocaine or, more precisely,' crack.' But it was difficult to gauge
the cocaine/crack crisis. There were two national surveys of drug
use. The National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA") administered the most comprehensive survey-the National Household
Survey on Drug Abuse ("NHSDA")-in 1977, 1979, 1982, 1985,
and 1988.' This survey was designed to cover a statistically representative sample of the American population, aged twelve and
older, living in households.' Although this sample represented
well over 90 percent of the population twelve and older, it did not
represent key groups associated with heavy drug use, such as
those in jails and prisons, the homeless, and addicts and heavy
users not then in stable households." Moreover, NIDA conducted
the NHSDA once every three years, and the results took approximately a year to prepare-the 1988 survey results were not
available until July 1989.'
The NHSDA indicated that while current use' of marijuana
declined between 1979 and 1985, cocaine use rose by 38 percent
between 1982 and 1985 alone.'

1509.
' Crack is the freebase, smokable form of cocaine.
4 Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1989 672
(1990).
Id.
6 Id.

7 Id.
"Current use" is use at least once in the month prior to the survey and is considered a measure of casual or semi-regular, but non-addicted, users.
' Office of Applied Studies ("OAS"), Preliminary Estimates From the 1992 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse 37 (1993).
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Chart 1
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The National High School Senior Drug Abuse Survey (the
"High School Senior Survey"), the other major national survey of
drug use, is an annual survey which began in 1975 as part of a
larger program called "Monitoring the Future: A Continuing
Study of the Lifestyles and Values of Youth." It is conducted by
the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research and
funded by NIDA.10 The High School Senior Survey revealed a
steady decline in overall illegal drug use from a peak in 1979.
However, current cocaine use by seniors rose to a peak in 1985,
and although such use declined between 1985 and 1988, measurement of crack use began in 1987 and rose between 1987 and
1988. The available results of the Household Survey and the
High School Senior Survey for cocaine and crack were not
reassuring."

to The National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA"), is part of the United States Department of Health and Human Services.
"1 Press Release for the 1992 High School Senior Survey table 4 (University of Michigan News and Information Services, Apr 9, 1993) (press release); OAS, PreliminaryEstimates, table 2 at 7 (cited in note 9). See also Lloyd D. Johnston, Patrick M. O'Malley, and
Jerald G. Bachman, National Survey Results on Drug Use from the Monitoringthe Future
Study, 1975-1992 74-75 (1993).
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Chart 2
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Source cited in note 11.

In addition, since the High School Senior Survey measured
only a nationally representative sample of high school seniors, it
did not contain information about dropouts-whose rates of drug
use are generally believed to be higher than their peers still in
school. With the prevailing fear that crack addiction was rapidly
spreading in large metropolitan areas, where dropout rates
approached 50 percent, the question was: did the High School
Senior Survey reveal only the tip of the iceberg?
Two other indicators of drug use caused even greater concern. The Drug Abuse Warning Network ("DAWN"), administered
by NIDA, began in 1972. DAWN reported on hospital emergency
room cases involving drug-related health emergencies and drugrelated deaths in major metropolitan areas across the country.
DAWN reported the data on a quarterly basis, but the data was
not published until between six and nine months after being
gathered (the last two quarters of 1988 were released during the
first half of 1989, at the same time that the first National Drug
Control Strategy was being prepared). The DAWN data for cocaine and heroin were generally believed to indicate trends in
heavy use more than in occasional or casual use, and the data
seemed to reflect a rapidly growing cocaine problem." 2

" Office of National Drug Control Policy ("ONDCP"), Leading Drug Indicators 12-13
(1990).
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Chart 3
COCAINE EMERGENCY-ROOM CASES, 1985-1988
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These data suggested a worsening cocaine and crack problem, and media reports of crime related to cocaine trafficking
seemed to corroborate this conclusion. Later analysis, funded by
ONDCP, confirmed the status of cocaine and crack as the principal- drug problem in 1989. The Drug Office initiated a study conducted by Abt Associates for the first time employing both the

available drug use data and available data on the production of
illegal drugs in order to estimate the size of the illegal drug
market in the United States.1 3 Most recently, this study found
that cocaine composes roughly three-fifths of the illegal
market."
In July 1989, NIDA provided ONDCP with the results of the
1988 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. The estimated
number of current cocaine users dropped from 5.8 million in 1985
to 2.9 million in 1988-a remarkable 50 percent reduction. 5
This drop seemed to indicate a rapid decline in casual, nonaddicted use of cocaine. The results, however, were not above
question. Public attitudes towards drug use in general, and
toward cocaine use in particular, had become much more negative between 1985 and 1988. Even in an anonymous survey,
participants were likely to underreport drug use. No one knew
how much underreporting occurred in either the NHSDA or in
the High School Senior Survey, or the extent to which under-

William Rhodes, Paul Scheiman, and Kenneth Carlson, What America's Users
Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-1991 (Abt Associates, Inc., 1993) (released by ONDCP on
Aug 23, 1993).
.14 Id, table A at 4.
OAS, PreliminaryEstimates at 12 (cited in note 9).
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reporting rates may have changed over time. 6 In the absence of
specific evidence to the contrary, however, the Bush Administration considered the NHSDA the best measure of drug use trends
in the general population. Accordingly, the results of the NHSDA
formed the foundation of Bush Administration policy.
Chart 4
COCAINE-RELATED DEATHS, 1985-1988
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Chart 5
U.S. EXPENDITURES ON ILLICIT DRUGS, 1988-1991
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Therefore, the first National Drug Control Strategy (the
"Strategy"), released by the President in September 1989, began

The ONDCP funded analysis of this problem, but the results have not yet been
published. See Christine Smith and William Rhodes, Drug Use by Age Cohorts Over Time
(Abt Associates, Inc., 1992); Christine Smith and William Rhodes, Bias in Self Reporting
by Birth Cohorts Over Time as Reflected in the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse
(Abt Associates, Inc., 1992).
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with the results of the NHSDA and the "very good news" it
offered. However, the Strategy also acknowledged:
Most Americans remain firmly convinced that drugs
represent the gravest present threat to our national
well-being-and with good reason. Because a wealth of
other, up-to-date evidence suggests that our drug problem is getting worse, not better. 7
In identifying the heart of the problem, the Strategy made its
highest priority very specific: "What, then, accounts for the intensifying drug-related chaos that we see every day in our newspapers and on television? One word explains much of it. That
word is crack." 8 The Strategy characterized the crack-led drug
problem in these terms:
[Tihe epidemiological trend is unmistakable. We are
now fighting two drug wars, not just one. The first and
easiest is against "casual" use of drugs by many Americans, and we are winning it. The other, much more
difficult war is against addiction to cocaine. And on this
second front, increasingly located in our cities, we are
losing-badly. 9
Even with the benefit of today's hindsight, we could not create a
more accurate description of the 1989 drug problem.
II. How DID THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION FIGHT THE DRUG WAR?
The anti-drug efforts of the Bush Administration had three
principal goals: first, to foster the continued decline in casual
drug use by reinforcing prevention measures (particularly in
segments of the nation at greatest risk from such use); second, to
increase treatment capacity and treatment effectiveness for
addicts; and third, to reduce the supply and availability of illegal
drugs (cocaine most of all) by attacking vulnerabilities in the
drug trade at home and abroad. ° In support of this effort, fed17ONDCP,

1989 National Drug Control Strategy 1 (1989).

Id at 3 (emphasis in original).
'9 Id at 4.
20 Tonry states that "[alithough good-faith arguments could be made for continuing

efforts to target major importers, distributors, and traffickers, for increased support for
drug education programs in schools, and for drug treatment for those who wanted it, none
could be made for vastly increased emphasis on law enforcement directed at users, userdealers, and street-level trafficking." Tonry, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 28 (cited in note 1).

Had he bothered to read the policy and budget documents of the Bush administration, he
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eral spending on drug control programs rose dramatically from
1989 to 1993.21
During the Bush Administration, federal anti-drug spending
grew by almost 80 percent, with the largest increases occurring
in prevention and treatment programs-up 99 percent. In fiscal
year ("FY") 1993, under the last Bush Administration drug control budget, the federal government planned to spend more on
drug treatment than on border interdiction ($2.2 billion versus
$1.9 billion), more on prevention than on federal domestic drug
law investigations ($1.5 billion versus $1.4 billion), and more on
drug treatment in Veterans Administration hospitals alone than
on all drug control programs
in foreign countries ($753 million
22
versus $538 million).
Chart 6
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Source cited in note 21.

A progress report published in January 1993 includes a summary of key federal drug control initiatives advanced during the
Bush Administration:
o Proposed and signed into law legislation requiring
federally-funded schools and colleges to implement drug
prevention programs and policies as a condition of eligibility for federal assistance.

would have found both that the activities he feels were justified were administration priorities and that the activities he criticizes were not.
21 ONDCP, National Drug Control Budget, by Function (1992) (unpublished internal
report).
' Terence J. Pell and John P. Walters, What Did We Do in the Drug War? Plenty,
Washington Post A25 (Apr 16, 1993).
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o Created a new $100 million per year grant program
to help communities mobilize against drugs.
o Increased funding for drug prevention in public housing communities from $8 million in FY 1989 to $175
million in FY 1993.
o Proposed budget increases that would have doubled
federal funding for school systems ravaged by drugs and
drug-related crime.
o Doubled funding for drug treatment services and
research, and proposed and signed into law legislation
that improves state strategic planning for drug treatment systems.
o Initiated the development of model drug treatment
protocols and standards of care for treatment providers.
o Pioneered multimodality drug treatment campuses
and experimental programs integrating drug treatment
at Job Corps training centers.
o Enhanced the air and maritime surveillance system
along the southern U.S. border and in the Caribbean.
o Championed the community policing approach to local
law enforcement.
o Created a new Weed and Seed initiative to combat
drug trafficking and social disorder in high-crime urban
areas.
o Designated five High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Areas and provided them with intensive federal resources.
o For the first time, utilized significant elements of the
U.S. Armed Forces in the fight against illegal drugs.
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o Expanded cooperative programs with Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Thailand, and other source and transit countries.
o Increased the use of boot camps and other alternative
sanctions for drug offenders.
o Greatly increased the eradication of domesticallygrown marijuana crops.'

These initiatives form only a part of the Bush
Administration's anti-drug effort. National leadership-Presidential leadership-was always understood to be an
important stimulus to action beyond anything federal budgets
supported.
The legislation creating ONDCP-the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988-made clear that the Strategy and the work of ONDCP
was expected to provide national leadership and direction and
not just guide federal efforts. From the specific responsibility to
establish quantifiable national goals, to the requirement that
ONDCP prepare and publish model state anti-drug legislation,
the Act intended the work of the Drug Czar to move far beyond
directing strictly federal activities. Most prevention efforts-in
families, schools, workplaces, and community groups-draw
resources from state and local government, but most of all from
the private sector. The same is true of treatment and law enforcement activities. 2' Thus, the Drug Czar and the President
consciously planned their use of the "bully-pulpit" to stimulate
much greater national effort than that directly funded by the
federal budget. The 1993 National Drug Control Strategy summarizes succinctly the Bush Administration's recognition of and
response to this responsibility:

ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy:Progress in the War on Drugs 1989.1992
4-5 (1993).
' The 1989 Strategy noted that the 1987 estimate of national treatment expenditures found that 23 percent came from the federal government, 33 percent from state and

local governments, and 44 percent from private-sector sources--largely payments from
private insurance policies and services provided by nonprofit organizations. ONDCP, National Drug Strategy at 38 (cited in note 17). Arrest, prosecution, and incarceration data
reveal that the vast majority of drug-related law enforcement effort is carried out by state

and local authorities. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System
142, 158, 171 (1992). See also discussion of incarceration in note 1.
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The September 1989 Strategy and each succeeding
Strategy have been grounded in four key principles that
make explicit the Bush Administration's understanding
of the nature of our Nation's drug problem:
The essence of the drug problem is drug use.
Our ultimate goal, and the measure of our
success, must be to reduce the number of Americans who use drugs. Heretofore, our progress
in fighting drugs was frequently measured in
terms of the number of arrests, conviction
rates, and quantities of drugs seized. These
are useful indicators, but they address only
the symptoms, not the problem itself: drug
use. Too little attention had been given to
such indicators of drug use as drug-related
deaths, injuries, and levels of drug use among
various populations.
Because they are the heart of the problem, drug
users must be held accountable. Although
there are many reasons why individuals take
drugs-such as unemployment, boredom, peer
pressure, homelessness, and mental disorders-by and large, drug use is the result of
bad decisions by individuals exercising free
will. An important means of persuading individuals not to use drugs is to make it clear to
them that using drugs will lead inevitably to
specific adverse consequences and sanctions.
These may and should include a range of civil
and criminal penalties, from loss of professional license to court-ordered drug treatment,
as well as social sanctions from family, school,
and community.
To be effective, the Strategy must be comprehensive, integratingefforts to reduce the supply
as well as the demand for drugs. No single
tactic, pursued alone or to the detriment of
others, can be effective in reducing drug use.
Rather, pressure must be applied along all
fronts of the drug war simultaneously, recog-
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nizing that although prevention is the longterm solution, short-term measures to treat
addiction and restrict the availability of drugs
can give prevention a chance to work.
We must have a national, not just a Federal
drug strategy. Because the drug problem is
national in scope, its solution lies only in vigorous, coordinated efforts at the Federal,
State, and local levels. Any National Drug
Control Strategy that ignores the important
roles of State and local entities, the private
sector, religious institutions, and families, is
destined to fail.25
President Bush and his Drug Policy Directors, William
Bennett and Robert Martinez, recognized hundreds of prevention,
treatment, and community anti-drug efforts and, during conferences and trips throughout the nation, publicized them as
examples for others to follow. President Bush also personally
presented each of the four National Drug Control Strategies
prepared during his Administration and made frequent trips to
highlight progress on the "front lines"-from Cartagena, Colombia to Los Angeles, California. In this way, the President forged a
common purpose among many Americans who had no direct link
to a federal government anti-drug program.
III. WHAT WAS ACCOMPLISHED?

The first National Drug Control Strategy emphasized that
youthful casual use and experimentation spreads drug use.2" In
the vast majority of cases, use begins, if ever, in the period from
adolescence to the early twenties with the offer of drugs from a
friend.27 It is from this first stage-casual use-that some individuals later go on to problem use and addiction." Addicts use
greater quantities of drugs-they are in this sense a greater
source of demand-than casual users. However, casual use is the
"carrier," in the epidemiological sense, of greater casual use and,

ONDCP, National Drug Strategy: 1989-1992 at 2-3 (cited in note 23) (emphasis in
the original).
ONDCP, NationalDrug Strategy at 10-11 (cited in note 17).
27 Smith and Rhodes, Age Cohorts at 3 (cited in note 16).
See ONDCP, National Drug Strategy at 11 (cited in note 17).
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for a portion of casual users, subsequent addiction.2 9 For this
reason, further reduction in casual use, particularly by young
people, was a foremost policy priority throughout the Bush
Administration. 0
The war against casual use was a huge success. Between
1988 and 1992, cocaine use by current users dropped by almost
60 percent, from an estimated 2.9 million to 1.3 million. 31 For
the population twelve to seventeen years of age, the decline in
current cocaine use from 1988 to 1992 was over 70 percent, while
for the age group of eighteen to twenty-five, it was over 60
percent.32
Chart 7
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From its peak in 1985 until 1992, current cocaine use
dropped almost 80 percent.33 Both current use of any illicit drug
and current marijuana use dropped by roughly 22 percent
between 1988 and 1992, more rapidly than the rate of decline for
such use between 1979-the peak-and 1988. 34
29 Id at 10-11.
3o Between its 1975 initiation and 1989, the High School Senior Survey found that a

majority of high school seniors had tried an illegal drug at least once prior to graduation;
that is, the typical high school experience for over fourteen years included illegal drugs.
Johnston, O'Malley, & Bachman, Monitoring the Future table 11 at 74 (cited in note 11).
31 OAS, PreliminaryEstimates at 12 (cited in note
9).
" Id table 15B at 61. The High School Senior Survey reported both a 62 percent
reduction in current cocaine use between 1988 and 1992 and a slightly higher percentage
reduction in current crack use. From the 1985 peak until 1992, current cocaine use among
high school seniors dropped by over 80 percent. University of Michigan, Monitoring the
Future table 4 (cited in note 11).
QAS, PreliminaryEstimates at 12 (cited in note 9).
O
3 Id table 2 at 37.
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Chart 8
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On the second front of the drug war-heavy, addictive illegal
drug use-the number of addicts stopped growing and seemed to
stabilize over the course of the Administration, but the number
apparently did not decline substantially. 5
Chart 9
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HEAVY COCAINE USERS, 1988-1991
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Despite a doubling of federal treatment funding between
1988 and 1993,36 expanded efforts have failed to reach at-risk
populations with treatment services, to extend those services in
the criminal justice system, and to improve the quality of treatment services generally in the hopes that greater treatment
activities would reduce the number of addicts.
Rhodes, Scheiman, and Carlson, What America's Users Spend table 1 at 10 (cited in
note 13).
ONDCP, National Drug Control Budget at 4 (cited in note 21).
a7ONDCP, National Drug Control Strategy: A Nation Responds to Drug Use 56-76
(1992).
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Chart 10
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There have always been some outstanding treatment programs, 38 but, in general, the performance of the drug treatment
structure nationally has been disappointing.
On August 9, 1993, Clinton Administration Director of
National Drug Control Policy, Lee Brown, released a research
paper entitled "Characteristics of Heavy Cocaine Users." That
study included a number of sobering points, including:
It is regrettable that so little is definitively known
about the effectiveness of either punishment or treatment on heavy cocaine use. Those heavy users who are
identified in the criminal justice system seem to appear
repeatedly; best estimates indicate that arrestees who
test positive for cocaine use will be arrested an average
of 1.5 times per year when they are not confined. And
while many users benefit from treatment, compulsive
use is most frequently a chronic condition. The Treatment Outcome Prospectives Study (TOPS) showed that
for every 10 clients who used cocaine regularly during
the year prior to treatment, six clients had returned to
heavy use one year after treatment, and eight clients
had relapsed into heavy use within three to five years
after treatment. These statistics do not accurately reflect the success of treatment outcomes. (The TOPS
study is the most recent large-scale study of treatment
outcomes. Many smaller scale treatment studies show
results with better long-term outcomes.) Nevertheless,

See ONDCP, UnderstandingDrug Treatment 13-28 (1990).
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the TOPS data suggest that treated cocaine users are
more likely than not to return to drug use.39
Ironically, the one area of the anti-drug effort that seems to
have made the greatest contribution to reducing drug use among
heavy cocaine users is supply reduction-more precisely, interdiction and the cocaine source-country programs. This is ironic because the dogmatic advocates of greater emphasis on reducing
cocaine addiction through treatment frequently recommend funds
for this purpose be taken from federal spending on interdiction
and foreign drug control programs. °
After climbing steeply in the early 1980s, the cultivation of
coca 41 reached a peak in 1990.42
Chart 11
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, Dana Eser Hunt and William Rhodes, Characteristics of Heavy Cocaine Users,
Including Polydrug Use, Criminal Activity, and Health Risks 14 (Abt Associates, Inc.,

1993) (emphasis added) (released by ONDCP on Aug 9, 1993 as Characteristicsof Heavy
Cocaine Users: A Research Paper).
o Mathea Falco advanced this same argument in her keynote address. See Mathea
Falco, Towards A More Effective Drug Policy, 1994 U Chi Legal F 9, 24.
t Cocaine and its derivatives are extracted from the leaves of the coca plant. Richard
R. Lingeman, Drugs from A to Z: A Dictionary 44 (McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1969). The
plant itself is actually a medium-sized bush, and, in growing areas of Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia, leaves can be harvested from the plants roughly three times each year. Timothy Plowman, Coca Chewing and the Botanical Origins of Coca (Erythoxylum spp.) in
South America, in Deborah Pacini and Christine Franquemont, eds., Coca and Cocaine:
Effects on People and Policy in Latin America 13 (Cultural Survival Inc., 1986). There are
different varieties of coca, and this variance (as well as other factors) is known to affect
the amount of cocaine that can be extracted from a particular batch of leaves. Id at 11.
"2 See generally Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, InternationalNarcotics
Control Strategy Report 15-16 (1993). This chart and the next four charts are based on
unpublished analysis by the staff of ONDCP's Office of Research, undertaken during the
Bush administration.
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Programs to eradicate coca cultivation in the Andean source
countries had little effect on reducing potential cocaine hydrochloride production."
Chart 12
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The Bush Administration's "Andean Strategy," as it was
called, marked a departure from previous United States reliance
on eradication in the source countries and border interdiction
near the United States to reduce the supply of cocaine. The President set forth the strategy in the September 1989 report:
The challenge is to motivate the governments of cocaine
producer countries to cooperate with us in significantly
damaging the cocaine industry, while proceeding with
anti-drug programs of their own. A comprehensive and
sustained multi-year effort, involving economic, military, and law enforcement support, will be implemented
to achieve these goals. The objectives of this effort must
be: isolation of major coca-growing areas in Peru and
Bolivia; interdiction within these countries of the delivery of essential chemicals used for cocaine processing;
destruction of cocaine hydrochloride processing facilities; dismantlement of drug trafficking organizations;
and eradication of the coca crop when it can be made an
effective strategy. We can and must accomplish these
objectives with a minimum of direct involvement by
U.S. personnel. This is a cardinal point. The countries

The difference between the gross and net production estimates on the chart below
is entirely the result of eradication.
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of the area must carry the principal burden themselves."

Although the details of the implementation of this policy lacks
pertinence to the present discussion, its results are relevant.
The seizure of cocaine in the source countries and in the
transit countries between the Andes and the United States rose
sharply as a result of expanded cooperation. This significantly
changed the potential amount of cocaine available in the United
States.4 5 The significant amounts of cocaine seized by state and
local law enforcement agencies further reduced the actual cocaine
available for consumption in the United States. Although we
have no precise accounting of these seizures nationwide, the
Drug Enforcement Agency's ("DEA") El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC) has offered an informal estimate of sixty metric tons. This
would make the overall estimated distribution of potential cocaine production for 1992. Thus, the extension of supply reduction efforts to the cocaine source countries has reduced the cocaine supply in general. In addition, the so-called "supply side"
battle also had a unique effect on heavy, or addicted, cocaine use.
Chart 13
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" ONDCP, NationalDrug Strategy at 63 (cited in note 17).
' The data does not subtract for state and local seizures or losses in transit.
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Chart 14
ESTIMATED COCAINE AVAILABLE TO THE U.S. MARKET

547

531

479

482

325

I

333
o

1987

-

1989

1988

Source cited in note 44.

398

415

37

38

[

Lowestimate

1990

0

272

.

263

,

1991

1992

High estimate

CHART 15
ESTIMATED COCAINE DISTRIBUTION -- 1992
(in metric tons)
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Note: Chart uses midpoints where estimates employ a range.
Source cited in note 44.

In the late summer of 1989, what is believed to have been
the Medellin Cartel, led by Pablo- Escobar, carried out the
assassination of a Colombian 'presidential candidate, Carlos
Galan, and publicly declared war on the Colombian government.46 In response, President Verhilo Barco launched the
broadest and most intense attack on the cocaine cartels in his-

" Associated Press, Columbia Arrests 10,000 After Slaying, NY Times A3 (Aug 21,

1989).
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tory.47 Shortly after that crackdown began, the United States
military deployed the most extensive interdiction, detection, and
tracking effort ever mounted against cocaine transit from the
Andean countries. Furthermore, during the autumn of 1989, the
largest cocaine seizure in United States history-twenty metric
tons-was made near Los Angeles. These events produced a substantial disruption in the cocaine supply to the United States
through the latter part of 1989, 1990, and into 1991, although
there are no exact measures of the magnitude of that disruption,
and the previous estimates of potential production cannot capture
it. Nonetheless, as shown below, there are important indicators of
significant disruption with beneficial consequences, particularly
for heavy cocaine users.
Reductions in the supply of cocaine would be reflected at the
retail level by an increase in street prices or a decline in purity
(or both), or by scarcity, if the disruption is large and sudden
enough."' As the above activities occurred, law enforcement
agencies periodically reported that cocaine trafficking groups
experienced problems securing cocaine or securing it in a timely
manner, even at a higher price. These reports could not be
offerred as precise empirical data.
The DEA, however, does compile data on cocaine prices
throughout the nation, and it reports these data on a quarterly
and yearly basis. This data reveals that in gram amounts-the
accepted retail quantity-the downward trend in prices through
early 1989 abruptly reversed.49 At the same time, the purity of
the cocailie sold also began to decline.

47 Id.
"' Tonry falsely asserts that cocaine prices declined during the Bush administration.
Tonry, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 40 (cited in note 1).

"' This data is from unpublished results of an ONDCP-funded analysis of data from
the Drug Enforcement Agency's ("DEA") System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence ("STRIDE"). The analysis was conducted by Abt Associates, Inc., and presented in
an ONDCP briefing entitled "Domestic Cocaine Situation" (Jan 27, 1993).
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Chart 16
RETAIL COCAINE PRICES IN THE U.S., 1988-1992
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Chart 17
RETAIL COCAINE PURITY IN THE U.S., 1988-1992
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A standardized price-a price that reflects both price and purity
changes by calculating the cost of a 100 percent-pure gram of
cocaine at each point of measurement-can perhaps best represent the magnitude of this change in availability.
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Chart 18
STANDARDIZED RETAIL COCAINE PRICE INTHE U.S., 1988-1992
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The above chart portrays the results of such an ONDCPsponsored analysis 0 Perhaps most important, this reduction in
the availability of cocaine-driving the price up and the purity
down-coincided with a 27 percent reduction in cocaine emergency room mentions between 1989 and 1990:"'
Chart 19
COCAINE EMERGENCY-ROOM CASES, 1988-1992
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Deaths related to cocaine use during this period also declined, according to medical examiner reports. 2 Analysis initiated by ONDCP and released in the publication, Price and Purity

'o Id.

OAS, Estimates From the Drug Abuse Warning Network: 1992 Estimates of DrugRelated Emergency Room Episodes 45 (1993).
5' See generally ONDCP, Price and Purity of Cocaine: The Relationship to Emergency
Room Visits and Deaths, and to Drug Use Among Arrestees (1992).
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of Cocaine: The Relationship to Emergency Room Visits and
Deaths, and to Drug Use Among Arrestees, found cocaine price
increases; purity reductions; and declines in cocaine emergencyroom cases, deaths, and cocaine use among arrestees for the
twenty largest United States cities for which the data is available.53 The cocaine supply reduction also coincided with the decline in the estimated number of heavy cocaine users previously
cited. 4
Chart 20
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HEAVY COCAINE USERS, 1988-1991
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Several general points must be emphasized here. First, the
available data limits the analysis. Nonetheless, the reduction in
cocaine availability seems beyond question, and its role as a key
causal factor in the decline in cocaine use, particularly heavy use,
seems a fully justified conclusion in light of the data. However,
we cannot "prove" this with the precision demanded in circumstances where the available data are more extensive.
Second, we should remember that both supply and demand
most likely affect cocaine price and purity. We know from the
NHSDA that casual or non-addictive use of cocaine was declining
dramatically immediately prior to and during this period. While
non-addictive users consume a much smaller quantity of cocaine
than heavy or addicted users, an almost 80 percent drop in nonaddictive users between 1985 and 1992 certainly reduced demand

See id.
4 See note 35 and accompanying text regarding heavy cocaine users. This is not surprising, however, since the estimate is derived to a substantial extent from the Drug
Abuse Warning Network ("DAWN") emergency room and medical examiner data, and the
arestee drug testing (Drug Use Forecasting) data.
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to a significant, if limited, extent not measurable by existing
surveys and analyses. In order to increase cocaine retail prices
and reduce purity, supply reduction efforts would have to cut
supply beyond the amount that would have satisfied the reduced
demand. Thus, the actual supply disruption may be greater in
magnitude than the magnitude of the change in the price and
purity data.
Finally, we should ask whether most prominent cocaine
traffickers have sufficient market control to manipulate prices by
controlling supply. If they do, we cannot use price and purity
reports to indicate market disruption directly; in fact, we may not
be able to use them here at all. We have no definitive knowledge
of the extent of traffickers' ability to manipulate the cocaine
market. In smaller transactions and at the wholesale level in
particular areas, law enforcement investigators have reported
efforts by particular groups to influence prices by withholding
supply. However, these have been limited in both scope and duration. There is no evidence of either large-scale efforts to manipulate availability or the ability to do so.
The cost of the entire international drug control effort for
programs and assistance to foreign countries rose from $209
million in fiscal year 1988 to $690 million in 1992 (its peak); it
moved from 4.4 percent to 5.6 percent of the federal drug control
budget. Interdiction costs increased between 1988 and 1992, but
most of that increase involved the estimated cost of Department
of Defense ("DOD") activities in support of the anti-drug effort.5 5
Chart 21
DOD INTERDICTION SPENDING AS A PORTION OF TOTAL FEDERAL
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See ONDCP, NationalDrug Control Budget at 1 (cited in note 21).
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Even with this increase, interdiction costs as a percentage of the
federal drug control budget declined.
Chart 22
INTERDICTION SPENDING AS A PORTION OF THE DRUG CONTROL
BUDGET, FISCAL YEARS 1988-1993
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If measured strictly by results, our national prevention efforts produced the most outstanding achievements, and, contrary
to conventional opinion, interdiction and cocaine source-country
programs seem to have contributed to the greatest reductions in
heavy or addictive cocaine use. However, two points must be
added to this conclusion.
First, the Bush Administration drug control effort always
emphasized the necessity of simultaneously putting pressure on
what it identified as a series of key strategic points. These points
included treatment, domestic law enforcement, and research in
both demand reduction and supply reduction technologies and
methods, as well as prevention, international programs, and
interdiction. Each drug strategy sought to explain, in some detail,
not only the areas of focus, but also how the activities called for
in those areas contributed to the effectiveness of activities in
other areas. I cannot recapitulate that analysis here, but the
reader should note that none of the criticisms of the Bush Administration anti-drug effort presented at the symposium upon
which this volume is based seriously addressed the policy.'
Second, if the data on cocaine availability presented above is
correct, why did the reduction in supply not continue throughout
1991 and beyond? Beginning in the summer of 1991, the movement of United States military resources to the Persian Gulf for

" I urge those with a real interest in this topic to go back to the original National

Drug Control Strategy reports.
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Desert Shield and then Desert Storm reduced interdiction coverage, particularly with respect to some of the most powerful airborne and surface naval systems. The military never retu)rned
those resources to previous levels. Plans existed within ONDCP
to make this a major policy issue for Presidential decision in
connection with the fiscal year 1994 Strategy, but the Administration ended before that Strategy was crafted. In addition,
without discussing all of the activities of the Andean Strategy,
the crucial pressure applied in Colombia on the traffickers
declined. First, the government was forced to divert significant
police and military forces to provide security for a national election and a constitutional referendum. Later, after the surrender
of several major traffickers, security forces focused twice on a
manhunt for Pablo Escobar-before his first surrender and after
his escape. This is not to say that all pressure on the cocaine
trade in Colombia ended in 1991-it did not. Even the imperfect
cocaine production estimates show that considerable damage was
done to trafficker activities, but the damage fell short of the magnitude of the 1989-1990 period and was hampered by protracted
difficulties in initiating meaningful Peruvian anti-drug efforts.
The change in the character of drug use has changed the
nature of the drug issue as a political priority. Not surprisingly,
as drug use in general, and cocaine use in particular, decreased
quickly throughout the vast majoiity of society, public concern
about the "drug crisis" also declined. A series of polls jointly
conducted by the New York Times and CBS News illustrates the
magnitude of change in the level of public concern about the drug
problem.57 The polls were conducted at various intervals during
the Bush Administration and inquired, among other things, as to
what the public considered the greatest threat facing the country.
In January 1989, approximately 15 percent identified the drug
problem as this country's greatest threat.58 This number rose to
over 50 percent in September 1989-the month President Bush
released the first National Drug Control Strategy.59 It then
declined almost continuously until January 1992, when approximately 6 percent of those surveyed named drugs as the greatest
problem facing the country, almost equal to "the
poor/homelessness" at the time. During the entire period of

See Almanac, NY Times A14 (Jan 27, 1992).
Robin Toner, The 41st President; Optimistic Mood Greets 41st President,NY Times
Al, A12 (Jan 20, 1989)..
"' Editorial, War: 1 Percent. Drugs: 54 Percent, NY Times A26 (Sept 28, 1989).
'7
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January 1989 to January 1992, no other problem or issue
recorded the level of concern registered for drugs in September
1989; for example, concern over Iraq and the situation in the
Mideast during Desert Shield and Desert Storm never reached
more than 20 percent in the same polls."0
The change in the political situation alone necessitates a
review of drug control policy. As the preceding discussion makes
clear, the current problem differs from the problem faced in
January 1989. Unfortunately, intelligent discussion and analysis
of the drug problem is even less common today than it was during the construction of the first National Drug Control Strategy.
This lack of discourse makes meaningful national leadership
particularly important now. The government must sustain prevention in an environment where drug use is no longer viewed as
a grave and direct threat to all citizens. Treatment and supplyreduction activities must be sustained and made more costeffective during a time when many other priorities compete for
resources and presidential attention.
In one sense, the drug war is over: the drug crisis no longer
threatens to sweep the nation. Crack will not become a problem
for the vast majority of Americans. During the latter part of the
1980s and into the 1990s a social revolution occurred. The rarity
of the 80 percent decline in cocaine use since 1985 becomes
apparent when compared to other social problems-particularly
problems affecting young Americans. Consider the potential public reaction to a reduction by 50 or 80 percent in the teenage
pregnancy problem, the high school dropout rate, or the transmission of HIV.
IV. RACE AND THE COCAINE PROBLEM

The drug war is not really over, of course. Those at risk
today are, to a great extent, the casualties of the time when cocaine use in particular was fashionable. The problem is much
smaller. Currently, we fight the problem of heavy, frequent crack
use among a steadily aging population of addicts. The drug problem is also more concentrated, and the available evidence indicates that it is increasingly prevalent in our central cities among
black Americans."

' See Michael Oreskes, Gulf Crisis Clouds Elections Outlook in US Campaigns, NY
Times Al, A30 (Sept 2, 1990).
61 See charts below.
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Once again, the available data allows us to construct an
understanding of the problem that is far from precise. However,
available data seems to indicate6 2 that in 1985, at the peak of
cocaine use-when the NHSDA found an estimated 5.75 million
current users-the racial distribution of cocaine users roughly
approximated the racial composition of the population as a
whole." Blacks were just slightly overrepresented, and whites
and Hispanics were just slightly underrepresented.
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By 1988, the estimated number of current users dropped to
2.9 million, but the racial disparities became pronounced. Among
current cocaine users, whites were clearly underrepresented in
terms of their portion of the general population, and blacks and
Hispanics were both overrepresented (Hispanics to a greater
degree than blacks).' The overrepresentation of blacks, however,
was most pronounced in the data capturing heavy users. The
NHSDA found that, among frequent cocaine users,65 over a
quarter were black. Furthermore, cocaine emergency room men-

ONDCP, Domestic CocaineSituation (cited in note 54); OAS, PreliminaryEstimates
(cited in note 9); OAS, Estimates From the Drug Abuse Warning Network (cited in note
51). There is no data for frequent cocaine users by race reported for the 1985 National
Household Survey on Drug Abuse ("NHSDA"), nor is there data on 1985 cocaine emergency -room mentions by race in the DAWN reports that is consistent with later data sets.
DAWN data is still under analysis, and this information might be available in the future.
OAS, PreliminaryEstimates at 42 (cited in note 9); Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1988 table 181 at 12 (1987).
" See Hunt and Rhodes, Characteristicsof Heavy Cocaine Users, table 2 at 6 (cited in
note 39).
" This is defined as use on a weekly basis during the past year. OAS, Preliminary
Estimates at 12 (cited in note 9).
52
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tions involved a higher percentage of blacks than whites." The
overrepresentation of Hispanics found among the current cocaine
users declined slightly in the frequent user NHSDA data and in
emergency room mentions.

Chart 24
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By 1991, the estimated number of current cocaine users
dropped again, to just below '1.9 million; the overrepresentation
of blacks among those users, however, became even more pronounced than in 1988, and the skewing increased in both the
frequent cocaine user estimate and in cocaine emergency room
mentions.67 In almost all categories of illegal drug use, whether
measured by type of drug or frequency of use, the number of
users has declined dramatically in recent years-and declined
dramatically for users of all races. The declines, however, have
not occurred at the same rate in different races. Additionally,
heavy, addicted use of cocaine is the one serious exception to this
trend.

OAS, Estimates from the Drug Abuse Warning Network at 44 (cited in note 56).
" Unfortunately, the latest available data from the NHSDA that contains reliable
racial data on users is from 1991. See OAS, PreliminaryEstimates at 26-27 (cited in note
9).
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A brief review of the trends in cocaine emergency room cases
offers perhaps the best available overview of the nature of the
most serious remaining cocaine use problem.'8 Cocaine addiction
has been an increasing cause of cocaine emergency room cases.69
In this chart, and in those on cocaine emergency room cases that
follow, the 1989-1991 cocaine supply disruption discussed above
is visible, and the reader should note that the disruption reduced
emergency room cases most among the portions of the population
most overrepresented-in this instance, cocaine addicts.
Chart 26
COCAINE EMERGENCY-ROOM CASES BY NATURE OF USE, 1988-1992
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This data does not distinguish between cocaine and crack cases-crack is reported
as cocaine.
' OAS, Estimates From the Drug Abuse Warning Network at 45 (cited in note 51).
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The cocaine emergency room case reports
also indicate a
70
progressively aging, heavy-user population:
Chart 27
COCAINE EMERGENCY-ROOM CASES BY AGE, 1988-1992
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Cocaine users under 25 years of age comprise an ever-smaller
portion of the total, while cases involving users 35 and over have
almost doubled between 1988 and 1992 (21,634 versus 41,288). 7
As noted previously, the problem of heavy, addicted cocaine
use increasingly concentrates itself in our central cities.7 2
Chart 28
COCAINE EMERGENCY-ROOM CASES BY LOCATION, 1988-1992
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The DAWN reports include data on emergency room cases in
twenty-one of the nation's largest cities.73 These individual
70

Id.

71 Id.
72

71

Id.
See, for example, OAS, Estimates From the Drug Abuse Warning Network at 33

RACE AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

107]

reports reveal that the number of cocaine cases in each of the
cities, although generally increasing, is not uniformly rising. The
great majority of the twenty-one cities demonstrated increases in
the number of cocaine emergency room cases in 1992 as
compared to 1988, but in some cities the increases were very
slight, such as in Denver (838 versus 832); in seven other
cities-Dallas, Minneapolis-St. Paul, New Orleans, Newark,74
Phoenix, Seattle, and Washington, D.C.-a decline is reported.
Most of these declines were small, both in the number of cases
and in the percentage of total cases they represent, but
Washington, D.C. represents a particular exception, with 8,478
cocaine-related mentions in 1988 and 4,236 in 1992.1' The cities
reporting increases display a considerable variation in the magnitude of increase, from the very small (such as Denver, noted
above) to the very large: the most extreme is Baltimore, with
1,994 mentions reported for 1988, and 8,078 for 1992.7"
Finally, the racial disparity
in cocaine emergency room cases
77
is pronounced and increasing:
Chart 29
COCAINE EMERGENCY-ROOM CASES BY RACE, 1988-1992
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(cited in note 51) (for cocaine).
74 Id.
75

Id.
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Id.
OAS, Estimates From the Drug Abuse WarningNetwork at 44 (cited in note 51).
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The reader should note that an increase in the number of cases,
or mentions, may not directly correspond to an increase in
users.78 Because the cocaine emergency room cases involve an
increasing percentage of older, addicted users, these individuals
are likely to enter emergency rooms with greater frequency. In
fact, cocaine mentions attributed to the "chronic effects" of drug
use rose from 19,569 in 1988 to 23,407 in 1992, a 20 percent increase.79 We do not know the precise extent to which increased
health problems and aging among the heavy cocaine user population are responsible for increases in the cocaine mentions. Therefore, several factors are used in combination with the DAWN
data to produce the estimates of the number of heavy cocaine
users.80 The best available data suggests that the heavy-user
group stabilized, and probably even slightly declined in size,
between 1988 and 1992. That evidence, compiled by NHSDA,
DAWN, and Drug Use Forecasting ("DUF"), also indicates that
blacks are probably a majority among the heavy users.
The crime associated with heavy cocaine use also reflects the
racial disparity. As the research paper released by ONDCP in
August 1993 states:
Heavy cocaine users are more involved in crime than
abstainers due to economic motivations (they commit
crime to obtain the resources to buy expensive drugs),
the effects of the drug itself (they become disinhibited
and commit crimes), or because of a life-style choice
(they participate in both drug use and criminal
activity). As to the latter, drug dealing is a natural
outgrowth of heavy use because most heavy users will
at some point stumble onto the opportunity to distribute
a larger amount of drugs than they consume. Selling
drugs helps them to maintain their own supply of drugs
and provides supplementary income.8 1
Heavy cocaine use increases criminal activity, and that activity
leads to higher rates of arrest and incarceration. The ONDCP
paper continues:

78 Id at 14-16.

Id at 45.
o See Hunt and Rhodes, Characteristicsof Heavy Cocaine Users at 10-12 (cited in
note 39).
81 Id at 10.
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The 1991 NHSDA asked respondents if they had
ever been arrested and booked for a crime and, if they
had, how many times they had been arrested and
booked during the 12 months before the interview. Half
of the heavy users reported having been arrested or
booked; only 8 percent of those who abstained from
cocaine use had been arrested. Furthermore, 23 percent
of the heavy users, compared with only 1 percent of
those who abstained, reported being booked during the
year before the interview.
NADR [the National AIDS Demonstration Research
Project] respondents are also heavily involved in criminal activity. Eighty-one percent of the heavy users have
been incarcerated at some point in their lives, and 30
percent have been in jail in the last six months. No
data are available concerning the specific crimes committed by this group.
In the DUF sample, 52 percent of all robbery
arrestees and 52 percent of all burglary arrestees test
positive for cocaine, indicating recent use.82

Heavy cocaine use is associated with criminal activity outside
that which is directly involved in drug trafficking and use. Both
heavy cocaine use and serious crime have become concentrated in
central cities, even as drug use and crime elsewhere have
declined. s3
This brings us to the question of whether trends in law enforcement, and drug-related law enforcement in particular, are, if
not racially unjust, simply ineffective or excessive. On this point,
it is worth quoting John J. DiIulio, Jr. at some length. In his
review of four books on the illegal drug problem, he discusses
this issue in relation to books by Mathea Falco and Elliott
Currie, both critical of law enforcement:'
Id.
Tonry argues that more minorities are arrested on drug charges because: (1) "it is
easier to make arrests in socially disorganized neighborhoods," and (2) more arrests indicate greater "productivity and effectiveness," for both "individual officers and for departments." Tonry, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 52-53 (cited in note 1). This may all be true, but
Tonry ignores two issues. First and foremost, where is the greatest concentration of criminal activity, particularly activity that is most harmful to the law-abiding community?
Second, Tonry does not mention that m.rst local law enforcement is driven by citizen complaints and calls to the police. Making arrests at open-air drug markets may be easier for
police than making other kinds of arrests, but many times it is the repeated calls from
neighbors in areas where such markets exist that virtually compel police action.
" See generally Mathea Falco, The Making of a Drug-FreeAmerica: Programs that
82

'
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[Tihere is no factual basis for Falco's and Currie's confidence that law enforcement efforts have been all cost,
no benefit. [James Q.] Wilson summarizes studies that
found a reduction in heroin use among youn% blacks in
Harlem: "Why did heroin lose its appeal for young
people? When the young blacks in Harlem were asked
why they stopped, more than half answered 'trouble
with the law' or 'high cost' (and high cost is, of course,
directly the result of law enforcement)."
In fact, it is not unreasonable to argue exactly the
opposite of what Currie and Falco do, namely, that the
problem with the "get tough" approach of the last
twenty-five years is that it hasn't actually been
followed. Despite mandatory sentencing laws, most drug
offenders and other felons continue to spend only a
fraction of their sentences behind bars. In 1986 the
median time served in confinement was fifteen months,
the same as it was in 1976. In 1984 most felons served
less than half of their time behind bars.85
Indeed, while imprisonment rates (the number of
prisoners divided by the total U.S. population) have
soared, what might be termed "punitivity rates" (the
number of prisoners divided by the number of crimes
for which people may be sent to prison) most certainly
have not. The number of commitments to state prisons
for each 1,000 serious crimes was 163 in 1960, 100 in
1970, 134 in 1980 and 131 in 1989. Between 1975 and
1986 the number of days a criminal could expect to stay
in prison was about one-fifth what it was in 1960. And
in many states, the likelihood of a convicted felon being

Work (Times Books, 1992); Elliott Currie, Reckoning: Drugs, the Cities, and the American
Future (Hill and Wang, 1993).
'

Dilulio, 53 New Republic at 55-56 (cited in note 1). During the symposium upon

which this volume is based, a number of references were made to mandatory minimum

sentences. Some of the participants alleged that these sentences were grossly unjust and
applied frequently against nonviolent, first-time offenders. In light of the strength with

which these opinions were expressed, it is worth noting that on November 26, 1993, The
Washington Post reported that a review of such sentences initiated by Attorney General
Janet Reno found justification for supporting "only tinkering that would reduce terms for
less than 10 percent of the 38,000 inmates admitted each year to federal prisons." Michael
Isikoff, Reno Has Yet to Make Mark on Crime, Washington Post Al (Nov 26, 1993). The
Post story notes that the Clinton administration Department of Justice supported "a narrowly focused amendment, offered by Sen. Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), that would enable
judges to exempt first-time, nonviolent drug offenders from mandatory sentences." Id at

All.
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sentenced to prison has remained under 50 percent for
all crimes except homicide.
The risks of going to prison for drug crimes may be
especially low. Based on a survey conducted in Washington, D.C., [Peter] Reuter has calculated that a drug
dealer who makes 1,000 transactions in the course of a
year faces an imprisonment risk per transaction of only
about 1 in 4,500-much lower than the risks associated
with other crimes, such as burglary and robbery. A
prisoner self-report survey in 1990 found that the average number of unpunished drug offenses committed
each year by the typical prisoner ran into the hundreds.
Perhaps this helps to explain why more than half of the
prisoner-respondents agreed that experienced criminals
"never seriously think about going straight."
Thus the arrest and imprisonment binge of the
1980s can just as well be viewed as mild relief from a
starvation diet that began in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Currie's and Falco's notion that inner-city citizens
would be better off with even less criminal justice action
against the predatory street punks and drug gangsters
in their midst borders on the fanciful. 8
When we step back from all the "get tough" and "get compassionate" rhetoric, it is remarkable that in America's cities, openair drug markets are a politically accepted fact of urban life. This
reality translates into an acceptance of the principle that the rule
of law, insisted on in our suburbs and almost everywhere else, is
not expected to extend fully to inner-city neighborhoods. In most
of our major cities, mayors and police chiefs do not confront sufficient public demand that they close the markets that are the
obvious and open signs of victimization and serious crime. Moreover, when bringing security to our inner-city neighborhoods is
discussed, the liberal segments of America's "chattering class"
still tend to refer to inner-city criminals as essentially victims of,
rather than perpetrators of, injustice.87 This occurs despite the
overwhelming evidence, which merely confirms common sense,
that criminals, including violent criminals and crack dealers,
commit the vast majority of their crimes where they live, victimizing their neighbors.

87

DiIulio, 52 New Republic at 55-56 (cited in note 1).
See, for example, Tonry, 1994 U Chi Legal F at 52 (cited in note 1).
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If we are going to address today's drug problem rationally,
we must discard the liberal dogma that disadvantaged circumstances cause criminal behavior. We must also abandon the notion that the difference between the disadvantaged who engage
in crime and those who are law abiding is of no particular importance for public policy. The NHSDA has conducted a special oversampling of six cities as a means of tracking illegal drug use in
metropolitan areas."
Chart 30
RATES OF DRUG USE IN SIX CITIES BY RACE
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Cities: Chicago, Denver.LosAngeles,Miami,New York, andWashington,D.C.
Sourcecitedin note94.

These findings remind us, once again, how small the drug
using population has become, even in areas where it seems most
concentrated. However, these findings also remind us that the
vast majority of Americans do not use drugs, the vast majority of
minority Americans do not use drugs, and the vast majority of
black Americans living in our cities do not use drugs.
Aside from everything else, for Michael Tonry to argue that
enforcing laws against drug trafficking is a racist attack on black
Americans is, to my mind, simply bigoted. Nevertheless, it
remains one of several forms of bigotry accepted by much of the
intellectual and political world. That the University of Chicago
Law School would publish such an utterly groundless and
partisan attack is shameful.

" OAS, PreliminaryEstimates at 20 (cited in note 9).

